The arsenal and strength of the Naxalites have steadily diminished since the central armed police forces (CAPFs) launched their well-crafted campaign against left-wing extremism. The Union home minister, Amit Shah, has articulated the government’s commitment to free India from the Naxalite insurgency by March 2026. According to official parameters, an area is considered free of left-wing extremism when “98 per cent of police stations in that area record no incidents of Naxalism throughout the entire year.”
This target is both pragmatic and attainable. Yet success hinges on the government and CAPFs thoroughly understanding Naxalite tactics when formulating their strategy. The hallmarks of Naxalite operations include strategic patience, calculated timing, avoidance of confrontation when outmatched, and a willingness to wait for optimal moments to strike – thereby wearing down their adversaries through imposed uncertainty and fatigue.
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Various voices in our country, particularly certain media outlets, characterize left-wing extremism as a “war” – a misrepresentation that fails to capture the nuanced reality. Democratic governments do not wage war against their citizens; rather, they strive to reform and reintegrate them into the constitutional mainstream. The government has never framed the Naxalite challenge in terms of war or battle. Instead, under the leadership of the prime minister, Narendra Modi, it has developed a four-pronged approach to address Naxalism – a comprehensive strategy grounded in legitimate governance principles.
This integrated approach mobilizes the CAPFs, state police, and civil administration in concert. The first two prongs involve direct confrontation with violent extremists through concentrated CAPF deployments, employing a measured strategy: dominate, clear, hold, and advance – systematically pushing Naxalites from their strongholds while gradually diminishing their numbers. The third prong targets their financial networks, particularly funds extracted from contractors and tendu patta (leaf) collection. The fourth prong emphasizes holistic development in areas reclaimed from Naxalite influence.
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Measuring success solely by tracking incidents provides an incomplete picture. A more sophisticated assessment must incorporate qualitative indicators before declaring an area truly free of Naxalism. Having persisted since 1967, Naxalism has established deep roots in parts of central India. While Naxalite influence has contracted significantly – from 126 districts across 10 states in 2014 to just 12 districts today – vigilance remains essential across the entire region given their adaptive tactics. Let us now explore what additional measures the government should adopt to completely eliminate Naxalism.
The Naxalites maintain a sophisticated organizational structure with distinct political and military wings. Their political apparatus comprises a “politburo” and “central committee” at the top, with regional bureaus, zonal committees, state committees, and district committees below. Their military wing operates under the “central military commission” (CMC), with a hierarchical structure of platoons, companies, and battalions. At the grassroots level, they deploy local operating squads (LOS) and local guerrilla squads (LGS) – small armed units known as “dalams” that carry out targeted acts of violence in villages.
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Previously, Dandakaranya hosted 10 military companies. The companies numbered one through four protected the infrastructure within the Abujmarh (also spelled Abujmadh) forest, while the remaining units were assigned to specific districts (company five to Kanker, for instance). A crucial fifth prong in the anti-Naxalite strategy must focus on dismantling this entire political-military architecture, ensuring no remnants survive that could reorganize during quiet periods following declarations of success.
The sixth essential prong involves making Abujmarh a strategic priority. This challenging terrain – inaccessible, hilly, densely forested, and sparsely populated – spans approximately 4,000 square kilometres across Narayanpur, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, and Gadchiroli. In fact, it encompasses virtually the entire Bastar division. Since forests and mountains naturally consume military resources, a carefully calibrated approach to dominating Abujmarh is imperative.
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This will necessitate methodically dividing the forest into operational sectors and further subdividing these sectors into manageable battalion zones. Forces must be deployed following exhaustive terrain analysis and meticulous operational planning to effectively encircle Naxalites and prevent their escape to neighbouring states. The Naxalites invariably maintain contingency plans; indeed, they may have already vacated certain areas or retreated to core strongholds to prepare for engaging security forces – preparations that require considerable time given the complexity involved.
After neutralizing Naxalites in an area, forces must remain in place rather than withdrawing prematurely. A sustained presence of at least two years is essential to thoroughly eliminate Naxalite influence from Abujmarh and other cleared regions. Even if an area reports no incidents for an extended period, security forces should maintain their positions. While formulating strategies to dismantle the insurgent structure and secure Abujmarh, the CAPFs must carefully analyse Naxalite tactics. Security forces should reflect on critical questions, drawing answers from their extensive field experience, and adapt their approaches accordingly.
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The CAPFs must recognize that while left-wing extremism as an ideology requires time to eradicate, its organizational infrastructure can be dismantled more quickly. Relentless pressure has already caused significant attrition among the Naxalite cadres through casualties and surrenders. With their organizational framework weakened and vulnerable, this presents an optimal moment to intensify operations. The critical question becomes: how will Naxalites attempt to sustain their insurgency and alleviate this pressure?
Understanding their strategic playbook yields valuable insights while minimizing security force casualties. Typically, Naxalites will temporarily withdraw, conserve resources, await favourable circumstances, and strike only after security forces have grown complacent through imposed fatigue and anxiety. They will also adapt tactically – operating in smaller units rather than larger formations, adopting civilian attire to blend with local populations, and further fragmenting their command structure. Previously, Naxalites maintained positions at rendezvous points away from roads near water sources for several days, but current conditions force them to remain mobile, rarely staying in one location for more than a few hours due to improved security force response capabilities.
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A telling indicator of progress is civilian cooperation. The CAPFs should assess whether villagers readily provide information about Naxalite movements and presence. Willing information-sharing suggests a genuine liberation from Naxalite influence. Conversely, hesitation among villagers indicates lingering Naxalite presence and intimidation, signalling the need for continued operations.
While the government’s objective to eliminate left-wing extremism by March 2026 represents an admirable commitment, the reality of the Naxalite tactics suggests a longer timeline may be prudent. The CAPF deployments throughout Dandakaranya, including Abujmarh, should remain robust until at least March 2028 to ensure complete eradication. The Naxalites strategists invariably develop multiple contingencies to counter security operations. If the government plans to enter Abujmarh in force, operations must be coordinated simultaneously from all directions, eliminating escape routes and preventing tactical withdrawals to predetermined fallback positions – a methodology designed to neutralize security force advantages without direct confrontation.
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With the Naxalites under sustained pressure from concentrated security forces, development initiatives must accelerate to permanently detach local populations from extremist influence and separate the Naxalite cadres from their organizational structure. Equally important is purifying the state administrative apparatus to ensure governance becomes genuinely people-centric, transparent, and corruption-free, particularly in revenue matters and everyday administrative functions affecting citizens.
A sustained two-year period without violent incidents would convincingly demonstrate that the Naxalite political and military infrastructure has been thoroughly dismantled and that their final bastion of Abujmarh has yielded to the “strong will of the Indian state.” The government would be well-advised to consider these proposals in the broader interest of national security.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect the views of India Sentinels.
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